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Young people in Chile have seen a sharp increase in 
their participation and their chances of involvement 
in the social roles shaped during the postwar period 
of expansion. The rapid urbanization, the great 
expansion of education systems, the extension of the 
political rights of citizenship, and the growing 
absorption of skilled and unskilled manpower by the 
modern production and services sectors were some 
of the factors which mobilized young people and 
turned them into some of the most committed 
agents of development and modernization; since 
development and modernization were also the axes 
of consensus among almost all the social and political 
protagonists, youth became, almost inadvertently, 
one of the central agents in the system. One of the 
most graphic instances of this was the remarkable 
political and cultural influence exercised by the 
student movements towards the end of the 1960s. 
However, a new phenomenon has emerged in 
Chile's social development in the past decade 
—social exclusion, which affects the structure of 
society itself, and thus all the social categories and 
agents, but whose deepest and broadest effects are 
probably on youth. "Exclusion" means the process of 
structural change by which various social groups 
which in the immediate past had occupied stable 
institutionalized positions in the social system, or 
could have firm expectations of places in it, have 
been dismissed from these positions or find their 
access to them persistently blocked. 
For this very reason youth was one of the main 
victims of the crisis, redefinition and distortion of 
the modernization processes: it can be said that in 
the past decade this exclusion has affected Chilean 
young people almost to the same extent that they 
had attained central positions in the system in the 
two previous decades. 
'Consultants to [¡CLAC's Social Development 
Division. 
I 
Crisis of growth and 
economic participation 
Young people in Chile today represent an 
extensive social sector with a high level of 
education —almost three times higher than the 
average level of their parents' generation— and 
with already remote migratory antecedents; they 
would seem to be in the optimum position to 
take charge of the complex tasks required by 
urban life, social modernization and political and 
economic development. In fact, one of the main 
goals of the expansion of the school system over 
the past quarter of a century was to involve youth 
in the development process. 
It cannot be denied that the education 
system"" showed remarkable efficiency in 
absorbing the whole of the young generation, 
leaving many elitist barriers in its wake. The 
latest census figures show clearly the decline in 
the rates of economic participation by young 
people due to the expansion of education: the 
labour supply of young people aged 15 to 19 fell 
nationally from 42.2% in I960 to 30.7% in 1970, 
and it fell in absolute terms as well. This drop 
was sharpest in the urban areas (from 38.8% to 
27.2%), the very areas which benefitted most 
from the growth in education; and it was much 
sharper for men, whose rate fell from 61.7% to 
45.3% over the period. Employment of young 
people aged 20 to 24 also declined between these 
dates, although certainly to a lesser extent. In 
this case the drop in the rate of participation was 
found only in the urban areas and again mainly 
among men (who benefitted most from the 
expansion of higher-education opportunities). 
However, for education to have been able 
to discharge effectively the role assigned to it, 
there would have to have been, in step with the 
expansion of schooling, a comparable expansion 
of the modern sectors of production, trade and 
services, which were the ones expected to absorb 
the better-qualified labour. When this did not 
happen, there was a resumption of the declining 
trend in the proportion of youth in the labour 
force. In fact, the projections indicated that the 
proportion of young people aged 14 to 19 was to 
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continue declining in the coming decades as a 
result of the extension of schooling, while the 
proportion of active persons in the 20-24 age 
group was to increase only as a result of a larger 
entry of women into the labour markets. But, 
despite the expansion of education, the pressure 
of young people on the labour markets did not 
decline by the expected amounts. 
Several studies have referred to the 
irregularity of Chile's economic growth as an 
explanation of the behaviour of the rate of 
participation. Cáceres (1981) pointed out for 
example that the economic activity of the 15-19 
age group fell sharply in the years of greatest 
expansion of education (1968-1973), but then 
increased during the acute recession of 1975-
1976. Rosales (1979) had earlier studied the 
cyclical trend in the rate of secondary 
participation of women, discovering that 
women's participation in the bottom strata fell 
during the 1975 crisis (especially in the over-20 
and under-45 age groups), while in the top strata 
this participation reached its lowest level for the 
whole of the period studied (1957-1977). This 
fact also helps to explain why the expected 
increase ¡n women's participation has not 
occurred, at least not so far. 
This thesis emphasizes the cyclical 
behaviour of the work participation of the 
secondary labour force: in conditions of 
economic crisis (with high levels of 
unemployment and a decline in personal 
Table 1 
CHILE: YOUNG POPULATION AGED 15-24, BY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND 

















































































































Source: National Statistical Institute (INE). For I960 and 1970: national population and housing censuses. For 1980: 
National employment survey. 
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incomes) the secondary work force, mainly 
young people and women, tends to join the 
labour markets. In conditions of stability and 
economic prosperity it reverts to inactivity. 
Cáceres adds that this situation occurs 
predominantly in the bottom strata, while the 
secondary labour force of the top strata 
(especially women) tends, in contrast, to 
withdraw from work activity in periods of crisis. 
In the bottom urban strata, however, 
unemployment of the head of the household or 
reduction of the family income prompt young 
people and women to seek work. 
The majority of these studies suppose that 
the oscillations in the participation rates 
correspond merely to short-term cycles of 
expansion or recession within a general 
downward trend caused mainly by the expansion 
of education. Careful analysis of the data from 
censuses and national household surveys on 
work activity and school attendance indicates, 
however, that in the past decade there has been a 
change of structure, and with it new trends in the 
distribution of young people by work activity and 
school attendance (table 1). 
The main point about the change in the 
trends over the past decade is the clear relative 
decline in young people who do not attend 
school and are inactive, which indicates an 
accelerated incorporation in activity (usually not 
accompanied by effective employment). When 
the effective distribution of young people by 
activity and attendance in 1980 is compared with 
the distribution which would have been 
produced if the trends of the previous decade had 
been maintained, it can be concluded, firstly, that 
the "real" decline in inactivity is the most 
important change that has occurred, and that it 
can be estimated at 212 800 persons. Secondly, 
that the increase in attendance is noticeably 
slower than the increase in activity. Thirdly, that 
two-thirds of the additional increase in 
attendance is attributable to the increase in the 
group of active attenders, and finally that two-
thirds of the reduction in the group of inactive 
persons who do not attend school is attributable 
to their assumption of activity without school 
attendance (table 2). 
These characteristics are typical of periods 
of economic crisis, when there is a mass 
assumption of activity by the so-called 
"secondary labour force". In this case the group 
which provides the most newly active persons is 
made up mainly of women aged 15 to 19 from 
the lowest educational levels. However, there is 
also some doubt about the truly "secondary" 
nature of this young labour force. The year of 
reference (1980) cannot be considered typical of 
a short-term recession: on the contrary, 
according to official estimates, in the period 
1976-1980 the product grew at rates above or 
close to 8% a year, and only two years later a 
sharp recessionary cycle began. There is much 
more justification for a hypothesis which 
associates such trends with a style of growth 
which, even in its best moments, maintained 
unemployment at double the historical rates and 
the real wages of the employed labour force at 
significantly lower levels than those of the 
previous decade. Since for a long time heads of 
household have been faced with unemployment 
or low wages, a reversal has begun in the 
downward trend of the participation rates, 
starting with the "weakest link" in the 
household: those members whose assumption of 
activity means lower short- and long-term costs 
("inactive/not attending"). This assumption of 
activity can undergo small or even substantial 
changes in step with economic cycles, but it is 
determined mainly by the general economic 
framework in which these changes occur and, in 
particular, by the permanent level of 
opportunities of work and income which this 
framework offers the heads of households of the 
less-favoured strata of society. 
Table 2 
CHILE: DIFFERENCES IN THE HISTORICAL 
TRENDS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND 
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE OF YOUNG 
PEOPLE, 1980 
Thousands of young people 
aged 15 to 24 
Attending Not attending 
Active 51.2 161.6 
Inactive 22.0 -234.8 
Source: Calculations on the basis of data from the National 
Statistical Institute (INE): national population 
and housing censuses, I960 and 1970, and regional 
employment survey, 1980. 
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II 
Occupational exclusion 
The greatest inconsistency of the promise of 
modernization has occurred, without doubt, in 
the area of employment. The conjunction of an 
increasing incorporation of youth groups in 
economic activity (despite the continued 
expansion of education) with the inability of the 
economy to generate, and even maintain, certain 
historical levels of employment produced a 
phenomenon of acute occupational exclusion 
which had a particularly severe effect on the new 
genera t ions . Waged or establ ished job 
opportunities declined sharply, as did the 
proportion and number of young people who 
managed to find work. 
Exclusion is different from occupational 
"marginality" as described in the 1960s: 
marginality has a very different starting point, 
for it generally concerns migrants from the 
countryside with little schooling who have not 
become integrated in the urban world. The term 
"exclusion" refers, in contrast, to the state of 
occupational marginality which affects a large 
contingent of population which formerly had 
access to established urban jobs, or was acquiring 
such access, and moreover was mobilized socially 
and culturally in that direction. It thus describes 
the process of reversal both in the employment 
structure in the past decade and in the processes 
of social integration which had begun earlier. 
Exclusion must also be distinguished from mere 
s tat is t ical unemployment . Occupational 
exclusion does not arise exclusively either from 
changes in the labour supply (demographic 
pressure or incorporation of the secondary 
labour force in periods of crisis) or from 
conditions of recession, although both these 
factors must be taken into account. It has its 
origin in changes in the structure of employment 
( indust r ia l crisis , reduct ion of public 
employment, etc.) and, therefore, in the patterns 
of development which reduce and impair the 
economy's capacity to generate established jobs: 
it is a question of the structural processes which 
establish and increase the mass of unemployed, 
underemployed and poor urban dwellers. 
The origin of the occupational exclusion of 
young people lies mainly in the decline in 
manual work, in particular in manufacturing 
industry. In the past decade the contribution of 
industry to the product and to employment fell 
visibly as a result of the policies of external 
openness and liberalization of the labour 
market. There was a collapse in the support of 
the former processes of modernization and the 
exports-substitution industry based on State 
backing and pro tec t ion , with a la rming 
consequences for employment. 
This situation can be seen in table 3. The 
proport ion of workers —waged manual 
Table 3 
CHILE: RELATIVE PROPORTION OF NON-
AGRICULTURAL MANUAL JOBS AND 
INDUSTRIAL MANUAL JOBS IN YOUTH 
GROUPS AND IN THE TOTAL EMPLOYED 
EAP, 1971, 1980, 1982 
Manual workers in 
total of employed 
persons 
Productive sector 
manual workers in 
total of employed 
persons 
Productive sector 
manual workers in 
total of manual 
workers 
Industrial manual 
workers in total 










































Source: Martinez and León, (1984). 
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workers— fell sharply throughout the decade: at 
the beginning of the decade some 40% of 
employed young people were manual workers. 
In 1980 only one-quarter of them were still 
manual workers, and that proportion declined 
even more in the subsequent years of crisis. The 
proportion of manual workers in the total of 
occupied persons had thus taken a dizzying 
plunge. The decline in manual work was 
especially significant in the productive sectors 
{industry, construction, transport and mining). 
At the end of the decade the number of young 
manual workers in productive sectors had fallen 
to half of the figure for the decade's beginning 
(barely 15% of employed persons in 1980, as 
against 27% in 1971). At the same time there 
was a change in the internal composition of 
manual employment: it became tertiarized and 
this meant deteriorations in working conditions, 
income levels, stability and the opportunities for 
young people to join trade unions. Moreover, the 
reduction in productive manual employment 
was concentrated in manufacturing industry. 
Whereas earlier manual employment was 
basically industrial (about 60% of manual 
workers were in industry), the proportion of 
industrial workers in manual employment at the 
end of the decade had fallen to below 40%. 
Lastly, the numerical superiority of young 
manual workers also disappeared, especially in 
the productive sectors; there occurred an ageing 
of the working population, an unmistakable sign 
of the difficulties encountered by young people 
in finding work in this sector. 
Additional information about these 
processes is given in table 4, which indicates the 
numbers and participation of manual workers in 
the young non-agricultural economically active 
population. These data show in greater detail the 
magnitude of the reduction in productive 
manual jobs and the influence of the industrial 
depression on that reduction. 
As we see, industrial manual workers 
accounted for 24% of the young non-agricultural 
EAP in 1971 (approximately 140 000 young 
workers in industry). In 1980 this proportion 
had fallen to only 9.5% (some 75 000 industrial 
workers). These declines occurred in traditional 
Table 4 
CHILE: PROPORTION OF MANUAL WORKERS AND CRAFTSMEN IN THE NON-
AGRICULTURAL YOUNG EAP (AGED 15-24), 1971, 1980, 1982 
Traditional industrial workers 
Modern industrial workers 
Strategic sector workers 
(excluding copper) 
Construction workers 
Waged workers in mining 
Waged workers in transport 
Productive sector workers 
Trade and services workers 
Craftsmen 





















































































Source: Martínez and León (1984), on the basis of INE figures. 
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industry (foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, textiles, 
clothing, etc.) and, above all, in modern 
substitution industry (timber, chemical 
products, rubber and plastic, cement, etc.). In 
both sectors young manual workers were found 
in industry. Manual jobs were maintained only in 
strategic industries and mining, but in both they 
represented a very insignificant proportion of 
the young proletariat. The crisis was 
concentrated in the substitution industry, which 
in the space of a decade shed some 65 000 jobs 
previously held by young people. There were 
also declines in the sectors of construction 
(despite the fact that at the end of the decade this 
sector experienced a favourable period) and 
transport, which together represented a 
reduction of approximately 15 000 productive 
jobs. 
The expansion of manual activities in the 
tertiary sector does not succeed in countering the 
sharp decline in industrial employment. The 
increases in manual workers in trade and 
services and in the crafts are insufficient to 
compensate for the decline in productive manual 
jobs. Manual workers in the non-productive 
sectors increase their share in young non-
agricultural EAP from 11.7% to 13.9%, while 
craftsmen decline from 4.7% to 4.1% between 
the beginning and end of the decade. Craft jobs, 
moreover, had always been occupied mainly by 
adults, owing to the skills and capital required; 
they therefore represent a very difficult 
employment alternative for young people 
excluded from industry. 
The crisis in manual employment had a 
clear effect on the increase in "excluded" young 
people —defined as those who remain 
unemployed, or in government mínimum 
employment programmes, or in domestic 
service, or own-account workers in marginal 
trade and services. These doubled their share in 
young non-agricultural EAP from 23.3% to 
45.5% between 1971 and 1980 —an absolute 
increase of 230 000 young people. The decade of 
the 1970s closed, in fact, with 363 000 excluded 
young people, and it had begun with only 
134 400. 
First among the traditional categories of 
occupational marginality is domestic 
employment, which has tended to stabilize in the 
past decade: its relative weight is maintained at 
approximately 11 % of the young EAP, although 
in absolute terms this means an increase of 
almost 23 000 persons. 
Here it is important to note the 
development of domestic employment, which 
historically had shown a sustained reduction in 
its share of the young EAP. The figures of the 
University of Chile indicate that between I960 
and 1970 domestic service declined from 27.9% 
to 21.9% in the 15-19 age group and from 20.2% 
to 15% in the 20-24 age group. In the past 
decade, in contrast, the proportion of domestic 
servants practically stabilized itself, with rates of 
20.7% and 13-2% respectively in the two age 
groups. A study by Heskia (1980) calculates the 
proportion of domestic employment in the 
employed young EAP for the period 1957-1979. 
According to her figures, throughout this period 
female domestic servants accounted for an 
average of 26% of female jobs in the 14-19 age 
group and approximately 15% ¡n the 20-25 age 
group. Heskia's series indicates a decline (not 
always continuous) in the proportion of female 
domestic servants in the two groups, which 
reaches its lowest point in 1974 with 
proportions of 131% and 4.7% respectively, 
and then climbs from the 1975 crisis to reach, in 
the remaining years, the level of the historical 
average indicated above. Rosales reaches a 
similar conclusion. 
The reduction in domestic employment has 
been explained by a decline in work activity on 
the part of young women and by the extension of 
schooling and the higher level of education 
which these women enjoy. As has been pointed 
out, the crisis pushes up the rate of participation 
of young women from the low strata, who again 
enter domestic service. The lack of 
diversification of female employment in these 
strata —accentuated by the reduction in the 
proportion of female manual workers, also 
detected by Rosales— feeds this trend in female 
employment. 
With respect to the remaining categories of 
occupational marginality, mention must be 
made of the increase in "marginal traders" who 
grow from 2.3% to 3.1% in the period (more 
than 10 000 young people engage in this 
activity). The proliferation of street traders is a 
characteristic of the employment crisis, 
especially in the big towns. Much more 
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important, however, is the institution of the PEM 
(Programa de Empleo Mínimo — Minimum 
Employment Programme) which covered 
almost 50 000 young people in 1980 and 
accounted for 12.9% of the young EAP. The PEM 
was set up during the 1975 crisis as a way of 
absorbing the effects of the generalized 
unemployment. The programme was 
maintained after the crisis, however, fluctuating 
between 120 000 and 180 000 persons (until it 
was again expanded in the present recession) 
and it took in an increasing number of jobless 
young people and women. In 1980 young people 
made up 54.9% of the programme. 
In all marginal jobs at present account for 
less than half of occupational exclusion. 
Whereas in 1971 one-third of excluded persons 
were unemployed, in 1980 unemployment 
affected some 534% of them. In the past decade 
the number of unemployed has tripled: from 
48 100 to 193 800 young people, and from 8.3% 
to 24.3% of the young EAP (table 5). Open 
unemployment has thus been the predominant 
form taken by the jobs crisis in these years. 
In the last quarter of a century the 
development of this phenomenon has been 
fairly clear. Three phases are usually 
distinguished. The phase of the 1960s was 
characterized by relatively low unemployment 
rates; the period 1970-1973 was marked by 
large-scale jobs policies which brought 
unemployment down to its historically lowest 
levels; and the last phase produced an explosive 
increase in unemployment, even outstripping 
the periods of recession. The evolution of 
employment among young people follows this 
same trajectory, as can be seen from the graph, in 
accordance with the unemployment series for 
Greater Santiago produced by the University of 
Chile. 
According to these data, unemployment 
shows an average of 36.7% in the 14-19 age 
group and 23.2% in the 20-24 age group in the 
period 1974-1982, thus doubling the historical 
averages registered in previous years. 
Unemployment increases sharply in times of 
crisis, but it has never truly decreased; even in 
periods of economic "prosperity" open 
unemployment stayed at about 25% of the 
young labour force (always, of course, with 
different rates according to age). Even when the 
periods of crisis are not taken into account, some 
200 000 young people regularly remained out of 
work in those years. 
These trends find their culmination in the 
recession currently affecting the Chilean 
Table 5 
CHILE: OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF EXCLUDED YOUTH, 1971, 1980, 1982° 
Occupational stratum 
Domestic employment 
Marginal employment in 
trade and services 
PEM-POJH* 
Unemployed and first-time 
job seekers 
Total excluded 

















































Source; Martinez and León (1984). 
"Young people aged 15 to 24. 
*PEM: Programa de Empleo Mínimo (Minimum Employment Programme). 
cPOJH: Programa Ocupacional para Jefes de Hogar (Work Programme for Heads of Household). 
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economy (table 5). Exclusion reaches alarming 
proportions: it increases from 45.5% of the 
young EAP in 1980 (363 000 young people, as we 
have seen) to 59-1% in 1982 (485 700 young 
people). At the same time, the reduction in 
manual and non-manual jobs reaches 100 000 in 
the short space of two years: the employment 
figures are 432 000 in 1980 (54.5% of the young 
non-agricultural EAP) and 335 400 in 1982 (only 
41.9%). The crisis can thus be seen as areal jobs 
disaster .suddenly striking approximately 25 % of 
the young people who had found some 
employment in the already harsh conditions 
prevailing at the end of the decade. 
The crisis causes a great reduction in the 
number of manual workers in productive 
sectors; among young people there is a 
spectacular reduction of 40.7% (among adults it 
is 29.9%). In this case, the crisis affects manual 
employment in manufacturing industry 
(including the strategic sectors), -which is 
reduced to an insignificant level (5.6% of the 
total EAP, i.e., 45 000 young people), manual 
employment in construction (which in 1982 is 
only 1.6% of the EAP, i.e., 13 000 young people), 
and manual employment in transport and 
mining. The productive sectors shed more than 
50 000 young manual workers (one half of total 
redundancies) and these sectors account for only 
9.2% of the young EAP. Manual workers in non-
productive sectors and craftsmen also show 
declines, although not as pronounced as the 
previous ones, which confirms that the crisis 
severely depresses the "real" sector of the 
economy. 
It is obvious that the crisis exacerbates 
exclusion. Here too the predominant form of 
exclusion is open unemployment (which affects 
almost 60% of the excluded young people and 
accounts for one half of total exclusion). Youth 
unemployment increases from 193 800 to 
288 600 (i.e., from 24.3% in 1980 to 35.1% in 
1982). However, on this occasion unem-
ployment also has a serious effect on adults: in 
the over-24 EAP unemployment increases from 
184 600 to 430 500 (from 8 to 18.2% between 
these years), and the participation of young 
people also declines (from 51.2% to 40.1%). 
This means that, in real terms, the crisis has 
affected the adult world more severely. The 
magnitude of adult unemployment at a time 
when the PEM was absorbing large numbers of 
young people and women prompted the 
establishment of the POJH (Programa 
Ocupacional para Jefes de Hogar —Work 
Programme for Heads of Household— which 
Figure 1 
GREATER SANTIAGO: EVOLUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES OF YOUTH 
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Source: Employment and unemployment survey by the University of Chile (June of each year). 
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was inaugurated with a subsidy which doubled 
the PEM) in October 1982; this is not reflected in 
the figures of the National Statistical Institute. 
Between 1980 and 1982 the participation of 
young people in the PEM continued to increase, 
reaching approximately 40% of the programme 
in the latter year; it had doubled from 46 900 to 
98 700 young people. 
It can thus be said, in general terms, that 
the evolution of employment among young 
people has followed a sharp incline: during the 
1960s the expansion of schooling was 
accompanied by occupational mobility expressed 
notably in the reduction of the "excluded", i.e., in 
low unemployment rates and a reduction in 
marginal jobs, as well as in the vitality of manual 
employment and the expansion of middle-range 
waged employment. Social modernization based 
on industry and the State collapsed in the 
following decade; this was brought about by the 
demographic pressure of youth groups on the 
Employment problems are not the only 
manifestation of exclusion. Mention must also 
be made in this connection of the processes 
which have affected the working-class family 
and of the exclusion from housing experienced 
by young people from that class. Observations 
made on the basis of a recent survey (Valenzuela, 
1984) indicate that the nuclearization of the 
working-class family has come to a standstill or 
gone into reverse: extended families are 
reappearing and the size of households is 
increasing, because young people cannot set up 
independent households (table 6). These 
observations indicate in fact that the average 
number of persons per household is now 6.6, as 
against 5.6 twenty years ago according to DESAL 
figures; the proportion of extended families is ¡n 
excess of 50% of the households interviewed, 
and in these households the commonest 
arrangement is for married children to be 
accommodated in their parents' homes. In the 
work markets, by the slowdown in the decline in 
the participation rates (despite the increase in 
the supply of education) and, above all, by the 
marked process of de-industrialization. All these 
factors, operating in acute recessions, applied 
the brakes sharply to the modernization process. 
Exclusion subsequently increased, especially in 
the form of open unemployment and 
underemployment, but also in the interruption 
in the decline of marginal jobs; the employment 
of young people was confined essentially to a 
segment which had managed to complete its 
schooling, and sometimes obtain higher 
education and could secure middle-range 
employment in the tertiary sector. This sector is 
probably the only area in which there are still 
some traces of the modernization process which 
enthused Chilean society a quarter of a century 
ago. The present crisis is the culmination of this 
process of exclusion and it has affected young 
Chileans in particular. 
sample, 54.2% of the young married couples live 
with their parents or parents-in-law, and a 
further 20.6% have joint occupancy (sharing 
accommodation but not incomes with another 
household). 
This inability of young people to obtain 
their own housing and thus organize stable 
families stems both from the free-market 
policies which substantially reduced the 
construction of low-cost housing and from the 
employment crisis described above, which 
prevents them from securing stable incomes 
sufficient for the establishment of new 
households. The annual average of housing 
starts declined from 52 000 units in 1971-1973 
(in the previous five-year period it was about 
40 000) to 30 000 units in 1973-1982. In 
addition, the proportion of housing starts in the 
public sector, which was formerly above 50%, 
declined to 19-5% in the latter period. The 
upward trend in housing construction was 
III 
Other dimensions of exclusion 
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Table 6 
SANTIAGO: FAMILY STRUCTURE IN THE WORKING-CLASS STRATUM BY 
HOUSING TYPE AND LOCATION 
Nuclear simple 
Nuclear with young married 
Nuclear joint occup. 
Extended w/ other relative 
Extended w/ cousins 
Extended w/ married siblings 
Extended w/ young married 
Extended w/ both 





































































Source: Valenzuela, (1984). 
interrupted in the latter years, and most building 
starts were in the private sector, which produced 
in accordance with market demands. It is 
estimated that the housing deficit may have 
increased by 300 000 units in the past decade, so 
that the total deficit would be in the order of 
850 000 dwellings (Rodriguez, 1984). 
These restrictions on access to low-cost 
housing explain the cohabitation of families in 
already precarious households. This causes 
enormous upsets: in general terms, family 
cohesion and the stability of young marriages are 
weakened. It has also been suggested that the 
housing deficit is connected with the increase in 
the numbers of young unmarried mothers and 
abortions. However that may be, the pressure 
for housing has increased strongly; it is 
calculated that between 135 000 and 200 000 
families live in joint occupancies in Santiago, 
which represents a suppressed demand for 
building sites in the order of 4 000 to 6 000 
hectares. The magnitude of the land-seizure 
movements is evidence of the size of this 
demand. 
Exclusion from employment and exclusion 
from housing are classical symptoms of urban 
marginality. In both cases, as has been pointed 
out, these kinds of exclusion primarily affect 
young people. It is important to add, however, 
that working class youth is largely excluded from 
participation. The survey mentioned above 
indicates that some 70% of young people lack 
organized activities, except in sports clubs 
(which attract mainly men). The rate of trade-
union membership is virtually nil (1.1%), as is 
participation in neighbourhood organizations 
(0.5%). The organization indices for young 
people are held up only by their participation in 
religious organizations ( 1 1 % of young people) 
and in parochial groups (10.8%) (table 7). 
Table 7 
SANTIAGO: LEVEL OF SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION AMONG YOUNG 






























Source: Valenzuela, (1984). 
"Includes sports clubs. 
''Includes neighborhood organizations, 
cultural and youth centres. 
'Includes Christian communities. 
trade unions, 
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Political and corporative participation is ruled 
out by political authoritarianism and 
unemployment, and it is only partially offset by 
community participation through the churches, 
which have been one of the main refuges in the 
crisis. 
In short, the involvement of young people 
in the world oí social institutions is limited to the 
It is sufficiently well established that age 
differences used not to have great importance in 
the lower strata of the population, given the 
early entry into work and marriage. But the 
expansion of education in recent decades began 
to give strength to the traditional concept of 
youth as "a period of transition". Paradoxically, 
this educational effect has led in recent years to 
exclusion from employment and housing, which 
has prolonged the "age of youth" in the lower 
strata. The generalized unemployment and 
underemployment affecting young people and 
the difficulties they encounter in setting up their 
own households are processes which delay their 
entry into the adult world. The notion of "youth" 
in this sense is also encouraged by the almost 
exclusively urban origins of the new generations 
{unlike the earlier generations of migrants) and 
by the exposure of young people to urban mass 
culture. The expansion of education, the 
impossibi l i ty of securing economic 
independence and a separate home, the urban 
origins and the numbers and concentration of 
young people in the same situation are all factors 
which gather excluded young people into a 
separate social group within the world or urban 
marginality. 
In these conditions of exclusion and 
alienation urban working-class youth shows the 
characteristics of disordered behaviour, with 
little apparent cultural cohesion, which have 
been associated with the breakdown of standards 
(Valenzuela, 1984). All the processes which 
contribute to the formation of marginal youth 
school Apart from this, they are completely cut 
off from organized society and especially from 
the State, which —in the circumstances which 
we have described— seems to them to be an 
almost exclusively penal instrument. 
groups tend in this direction: work alienation 
and instability, fragmentation and breakdown of 
family cohesion, political exclusion and social 
disorganization. All the processes of exclusion 
from organized society (the world of social 
institutions) have been at the same time 
processes of disintegration of collective life and 
solidarity. 
These non-organized young people show 
symptoms of withdrawal (drugs) and rebellion 
(revolt) which are consistent with a more 
serious breakdown of standards. In contrast, 
among organized young people (usually in 
Christian organizations) the symptoms of 
refuge and radical mobilization indicate the way 
to reduce this breakdown of standards. The 
symptoms of withdrawal and refuge prevail in 
periods of economic stability among non-
organized and organized young people 
respectively; the symptoms of rebellion and 
mobilization occur in periods of crisis, also for 
each group respectively. The first case is 
dominated by the many forms of reaction and 
defence against marginality; in the second case, 
possibilities arise for widespread social 
confrontation. In the period preceding the crisis, 
in fact, young people from the working-class 
strata exhibited two clear characteristics: the 
spread of the use of drugs and the emergence of 
grassroots working-class Catholic movements. 
Drug use has been associated mainly with 
the search for immediate pleasure (Lailhacar, 
1982). This includes behaviour connected with 
e r o t i c i s m , mus ic and r e c r e a t i o n . 
IV 
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Experimentation with drugs, in fact, has an 
almost exclusively escapist purpose: immediate 
gratification and sense of disassociation which 
provide a respite, even if only a fleeting one, 
from the realities of space and time, and an 
escape from the hardships of life. Drug use is not 
a culturally unifying experience, nor is it a 
community activity. The hippie aspect of drug 
use has disappeared. The sexual conduct of 
marginal young people characterized by lack of 
inhibitions and prejudices and by a basic 
instability is another aspect of this kind of search 
for immediate pleasure. 
On the other hand, a reaction against this 
disintegration (and the spread of disordered 
behaviour) has emerged in the community 
refuge. Some authors have argued that the 
flourishing of grassroots church organizations in 
working-class areas has indeed been a response 
to the fragmentation effects of the market and 
State exclusion. A connection with the old 
Pentecostal movements has also been 
established, and it is pointed out that these 
organizations act in exactly the same way as the 
pentecostal communities described by Lalive 
(1969) in Chile: "they reduce social rootlessness 
by restoring the primary group, formed around a 
network of affective relationships and shared 
values". Pentecostalism was, in fact, the 
counterpart of the model of working-class 
integration. "The expansion of pentecostalism is 
concurrent with the period of internal 
migrations (roughly the decade of the 1930s) 
which also coincides with the decline of rural 
society and the beginnings of industrialization. 
This typical phenomenon of transition causes 
dislocations among the working masses. Lalive 
discovers, moreover, that pentecostalism takes 
root precisely in the marginal categories of a 
society in flux, in the urban peripheries and the 
rural frontier zones where the property 
structure breaks down most sharply. In general 
terms, while socialism grows as a working-class 
ideology, pentecostalism develops among the 
uprooted marginal masses (who take refuge in a 
traditional value system and cut themselves off 
culturally from urban society)" (Valenzuela 
1984). 
Al though the grassroots church 
organizations propound a different theology 
from that of the traditional pentecostal 
communities, they are still expressing a reaction 
against a similar situation: the termination of 
the working-class mode or model of integration 
(waged work, trade-unionism, access to political 
representation in the State). In these 
circumstances both church and pentecostal 
grassroots organizations reestablish a 
community ideology (mutual help, co-operation, 
solidarity, human rights) and they invoke, lastly, 
the need to restore collective solidarity and 
dignity. 
The crisis has created a new situation in 
which urban working-class youth has an 
important role to play. Given the closing-off of 
the normal channels of social integration, as well 
as the channels of political expression and 
opinion, urban working-class young people, 
severely stricken by the effects of the crisis take 
up a kind of social action unforeseen either in the 
political organization of the State or by the 
political groupings which oppose that 
organization. This emerges as urban protest, 
which takes the place of protest at the place of 
work or study. This kind of protest can be 
described as "disordered rebellion". On the one 
hand, it is not connected with political 
institutions or groupings, for it does not seem to 
be concerned with claims for restitution; on the 
other hand, given the closing-off of the channels 
of participation, it creates extremely aggressive 
forms of struggle. 
There is no doubt that the political 
radicalism of marginal youth stems from the 
conditions described and it raises new questions 
about the future of this generation. 
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